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Footnotes 
1. The Open Society Institute, the State Justice Institute, and the
National Center for State Courts funded the preparation of this
article. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the funding organizations. This
article summarizes the National Center for State Courts’ project
on implicit bias and judicial education. For the full report of the
project, see PAMELA M. CASEY, ROGER K. WARREN, FRED L.
CHEESMAN II & JENNIFER K. ELEK, HELPING COURTS ADDRESS IMPLICIT
BIAS: RESOURCES FOR EDUCATION (2012) (hereinafter HELPING
COURTS), available at http://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/
Topics/Gender%20and%20Racial%20Fairness/IB_report_033012.
ashx.             
2. Various state-court reports of racial fairness task forces and com-
missions can be found through the National Center for State
Courts’ website at http://www.ncsconline.org/Projects_Initiatives/
REFI/SearchState.asp. To access the National Center for State
Courts’ Interactive Database of State Programs to address race and
ethnic fairness in the courts, go to http://www.ncsconline.org
/D_Research/ref/programs.asp.
3. For example, a 1999 a national survey of public attitudes about
state courts that found 47% of Americans surveyed did not believe
that African-Americans and Latinos receive equal treatment in
America’s state courts, 55% did not believe that non-English-
speaking persons receive equal treatment, and more than two-
thirds of African-Americans thought that African-Americans
received worse treatment than others in court. See NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, HOW THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE
COURTS: A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY (1999), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_AmtPTC_Public
ViewCrtsPub.pdf. State  surveys, such as the public-opinion sur-
vey commissioned by the California Administrative Office of the
Courts, report similar findings: A majority of all California
respondents stated that African-Americans and Latinos usually
receive less favorable results in court than others, approximately
two-thirds believed that non-English speakers receive less favor-
able results, and, a much higher proportion of African-Americans,
87%, thought that African-Americans receive unequal treatment.
See David B. Rottman, Trust and Confidence in the California
Courts: A Survey of the Public and Attorneys (2005), available at
http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-in/showfile.exe?CISO-
ROOT=/ ctcomm&CISOPTR=25. 
4. See SHANKAR VEDANTAM, THE HIDDEN BRAIN: HOW OUR
UNCONSCIOUS MINDS ELECT PRESIDENTS, CONTROL MARKETS, WAGE
WARS, AND SAVE OUR LIVES (2010). 
5. Social-science research on implicit stereotypes, attitudes, and bias
has accumulated across several decades into a compelling body of
knowledge and continues to be a robust area of inquiry, but the
research is not without its critics. See HELPING COURTS, supra note
1, Appendix B  (“What Are the Key Criticisms of Implicit Bias
Research?”). There is much that scientists do not yet know. This
article and the full report on which it is based are offered as a start-
ing point for courts interested in exploring implicit bias and
potential remedies, with the understanding that advances in tech-
nology and neuroscience promise continued refinement of knowl-
edge about implicit bias and its effects on decision making and
behavior.
6. See HELPING COURTS, supra note 1, Appendix B  (“How Is Implicit
Bias Measured”), for more information on measures of implicit
bias. 
Fairness is a fundamental tenet of American courts. Yet,
despite substantial work by state courts to address issues of
racial and ethnic fairness,2 public skepticism that racial and
ethnic minorities receive consistently fair and equal treatment
in American courts remains widespread.3 Why?
THE INFLUENCE OF IMPLICIT ASSOCIATIONS
Perhaps one explanation may be found in an emerging body
of research on implicit cognition. During the last two decades,
new assessment methods and technologies in the fields of
social science and neuroscience have advanced research on
brain functions, providing a glimpse into what National Public
Radio science correspondent Shankar Vedantam refers to as
the “hidden brain.”4 Although in its early stages, this research
is helping scientists understand how the brain takes in, sorts,
synthesizes, and responds to the enormous amount of infor-
mation an individual faces on a daily basis.5 It also is provid-
ing intriguing insights into how and why individuals develop
stereotypes and biases, often without even knowing they exist.
The research indicates that an individual’s brain learns over
time how to distinguish different objects (e.g., a chair or desk)
based on features of the objects that coalesce into patterns.
These patterns or schemas help the brain efficiently recognize
objects encountered in the environment. What is interesting is
that these patterns also operate at the social level. Over time,
the brain learns to sort people into certain groups (e.g., male or
female, young or old) based on combinations of characteristics
as well. The problem is when the brain automatically associ-
ates certain characteristics with specific groups that are not
accurate for all the individuals in the group (e.g., “elderly indi-
viduals are frail”). Scientists refer to these automatic associa-
tions as implicit—they operate behind-the-scenes without the
individual’s awareness. 
Scientists have developed a variety of methods to measure
these implicit attitudes about different groups, but the most
common measure used is reaction time (e.g., the Implicit
Association Test, or IAT).6 The idea behind these types of mea-
sures is that individuals will react faster to two stimuli that are
strongly associated (e.g., elderly and frail) than to two stimuli
that are less strongly associated (e.g., elderly and robust). In
the case of race, scientists have found that most European
Americans who have taken the test are faster at pairing a white
face with a good word (e.g., honest) and a black face with a bad
word (e.g., violent) than the other way around.  For African-
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7. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda H. Krieger, Implicit Bias:
Scientific Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REV. 945, 956-58 (2006).
8. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich,
& Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1209-11 (2009).
9. See, e.g., Marianne Bertrand & Sendhi L. Mullainathan, Are Emily
and Greg More Employable Than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field
Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AMER. ECON. REV.
991 (2004); Jonathan C. Ziegert & Paul J. Hanges, Employment
Discrimination: The Role of Implicit Attitudes, Motivation, and a
Climate for Racial Bias, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 553 (2005).
10. See, e.g., Alexander R. Green, Dana R. Carney, Daniel J. Pallin,
Long H. Ngo, Kristal L. Raymond, Lisa I. Iezzoni, & Mahzarin R.
Banaji, Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its Prediction of
Thombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 1231 (2007).
11. See Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park, Charles M. Judd, & Bernard
Wittenbrink, The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to
Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCH. 1314 (2002); Joshua Correll, Bernadette Park,
Charles M. Judd, Bernard Wittenbrink, Melody S. Sadler, & Tracie
Keesee, Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in
the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1006
(2007).
12. See Anthony G. Greenwald, Colin T. Smith, N. Sriram, Yoav Bar-
Anan, & Brian A. Nosek, Implicit Race Attitudes Predicted Vote in
the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election, 9 ANALYSES SOC. ISSUES & PUB.
POL’Y 241 (2009); B. Keith Payne, Jon A. Krosnick, Josh Pasek,
Yphtach Leikes, Omair Ahktar, & Trevor Thompson, Implicit and
Explicit Prejudice in the 2008 American Presidential Election, 46 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 367 (2010). 
13. JERRY KANG, IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS 2 (NAT’L CTR. FOR
STATE COURTS 2009).
14. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1225-26.
15. See Rachlinski et al., supra note 8, at 1221.
16. See Nilanjana Dasgupta, David DeSteno, Lisa A. Williams, &
Matthew Hunsinger, Fanning the Flames of Prejudice: The Influence
of Specific Incidental Emotions on Implicit Prejudice, 9 EMOTION 585
(2009).
17. For more information about the strategies, see HELPING COURTS,
supra note 1, Appendix G.  
Americans, approximately a third show a preference for
African-Americans, a third show a preference for European
Americans, and a third show no preference.7
There is evidence that judges are susceptible to these
implicit associations, too. One survey of judges found a strong
white preference on the IAT among white judges. Black judges
also followed the general population findings, showing no
clear preference overall (44% showed a white preference but
the preference was weaker overall).8
The question is whether these implicit associations can
influence, i.e., bias, an individual’s decisions and actions, and
there is growing evidence that the answer is yes. Research has
demonstrated that implicit bias can affect decisions regarding,
for example, job applicants,9 medical treatment,10 a suspect’s
dangerousness,11 and nominees for elected office.12
Law professor Jerry Kang gave this description of the poten-
tial problem this poses for the justice system:
Though our shorthand schemas of people may be
helpful in some situations, they also can lead to dis-
criminatory behaviors if we are not careful. Given the
critical importance of exercising fairness and equality in
the court system, lawyers, judges, jurors, and staff
should be particularly concerned about identifying such
possibilities. Do we, for instance, associate aggressive-
ness with Black men, such that we see them as more
likely to have started the fight than to have responded in
self-defense?13
The problem is compounded by judges and other court pro-
fessionals who, because they have worked hard to eliminate
explicit bias in their own decisions and behaviors, assume that
they do not allow racial prejudice to color their judgments. For
example, most, if not all, judges believe that they are fair and
objective and base their decisions only on the facts of a case (in
one study, for example, 97% of judges attending an educational
program rated themselves in the top half of the attendees—sta-
tistically impossible—in their ability to “avoid racial prejudice
in decisionmaking”14). Judges and court professionals who
focus only on eliminating explicit bias may conclude that they
are better at understanding and controlling for bias in their
decisions and actions than they really are. 
Law professor and social psychologist Jeffrey Rachlinski,
Judge Andrew Wistrich, and law professors Chris Guthrie and
Sheri Lynn Johnson also found preliminary evidence that
implicit bias affected judges’ sentences. Additional research is
needed to confirm these findings. More importantly for the
justice system, though, is their conclusion that “when judges
are aware of a need to monitor their own responses for the
influence of implicit racial biases, and are motivated to sup-
press that bias, they appear able to do so.”15 The next section
discusses potential strategies judges and court professionals
can use to address implicit bias.
REDUCING THE INFLUENCE OF IMPLICIT BIAS
Compared to the science on the existence of implicit bias
and its potential influence on behavior, the science on ways to
mitigate implicit bias is relatively young and often does not
address specific applied contexts such as judicial decision
making. Yet, it is important for strategies to be concrete and
applicable to an individual’s work to be effective; instructions
to simply avoid biased outcomes or respond in an egalitarian
manner are too vague to be helpful.16 To address this gap in
concrete strategies applicable to court audiences, the authors
reviewed the science on general strategies to address implicit
bias and considered their potential relevance for judges and
court professionals. They also convened a small-group discus-
sion with judges and judicial educators (referred to here as the
Judicial Focus Group) to discuss potential strategies.  These
efforts yielded seven general research-based strategies that may
help attenuate implicit bias or mitigate the influence of
implicit bias on decisions and actions.17
Strategy 1: Raise awareness of implicit bias. Individuals can
only work to correct for sources of bias that they are aware
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18. See Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination
and Mental Correction: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and
Evaluations, 116 PSYCH. BULL. 117 (1994). 
19. Cf. Green et al., supra note 10, at 1237 (finding support for the
IAT as an educational tool because most resident physicians were
“open to the idea that unconscious biases could affect their clini-
cal decisions, and that learning more about these biases could
improve their care of patients” and that physicians who were
aware of the study’s focus seemed to modulate the effects of
implicit bias on their treatment decisions). 
20. See Do-Yeong Kim, Voluntary Controllability of the Implicit
Association Test (IAT), 66 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 83 (2003).
21. See Evan P. Apfelbaum, Samuel R. Sommers, & Michael I. Norton,
Seeing Race and Seeming Racist? Evaluating Strategic Colorblindness
in Social Interaction. 95 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 918 (2008).
22. See  Laurie A. Rudman, Richard D. Ashmore, & Melvin L. Gary,
“Unlearning” Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit
Prejudice and Stereotypes, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 856
(2001); Richard J. Nussbaum & Jennifer A. Richeson, The Impact
of Multiculturalism Versus Color-Blindedness on Racial Bias, 40 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 417 (2004).
23. See Henk Aarts, Peter M. Gollwitzer, & Ran R. Hassin, Goal
Contagion: Perceiving Is for Pursuing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 23 (2004).
24. See Gretchen B. Sechrist & Charles Stangor, Perceived Consensus
Influences Intergroup Behavior and Stereotype Accessibility, 80 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 645 (2001).
25. See E. Ashby Plant & Patricia G. Devine, Responses to Other-
Imposed Pro-Black Pressure: Acceptance or Backlash?, 37 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 486 (2001). 
26. See, e.g., Maja Djikic, J. Ellen Langer, & Sarah F. Stapleton,
Reducing Stereotyping Through Mindfulness: Effects on Automatic
Stereotype-Activated Behaviors, 15 J. ADULT DEV. 106 (2008);
Sophie Lebrecht, Lara J. Pierce, Michael J. Tarr, & James W.
Tanaka, Perceptual Other-Race Training Reduces Implicit Racial
Bias, 4 PLOS ONE 4, e4215 (2009); Katja Corcoran, Tanja
Hundhammer, & Thomas Mussweiler, A Tool for Thought! When
Cooperative Thinking Reduces Stereotyping Effects, 45 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 1008 (2009).
27. See Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypes as Judgmental Heuristics:
Evidence of Circadian Variations in Discrimination, 1 PSYCH. SCI.
319 (1990); John M. Darley & Paget H. Gross, A Hypothesis-
Confirming Bias in Labeling Effects, 44 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 20 (1983).
exist.18 Simply knowing
about implicit bias and its
potentially harmful effects on
judgment and behavior may
prompt individuals to pursue
corrective action.19 Although
awareness of implicit bias in
and of itself is not sufficient
to ensure that effective de-
biasing efforts take place,20 it
is a crucial starting point that
may prompt individuals to
seek out and implement
additional strategies.
Strategy 2: Seek to identify
and consciously acknowl-
edge real group and indi-
vidual differences. The popular “color blind” approach to
egalitarianism (i.e., avoiding or ignoring race; lack of aware-
ness of and sensitivity to differences between social groups)
fails as an implicit-bias intervention strategy. “Color blindness”
actually produces greater implicit bias than strategies that
acknowledge race.21 Cultivating greater awareness of and sen-
sitivity to group and individual differences appears to be a
more effective tactic:  Training seminars that acknowledge and
promote an appreciation of group differences and multicul-
tural viewpoints can help reduce implicit bias.22
Diversity-training seminars can serve as a starting point
from which court culture itself can change. When respected
court leadership actively supports the multiculturalism
approach, those egalitarian goals can influence others.23
Moreover, when an individual (e.g., a new employee) discov-
ers that peers in the court community are more egalitarian, the
individual’s beliefs become less implicitly biased.24 Thus, a sys-
tem-wide effort to cultivate a workplace environment that sup-
ports egalitarian norms is
important in reducing indi-
vidual-level implicit bias.
Note, however, that manda-
tory training or other imposed
pressure to comply with egal-
itarian standards may elicit
hostility and resistance from
some types of individuals,
failing to reduce implicit
bias.25
In addition to considering
and acknowledging group dif-
ferences, individuals should
purposely compare and indi-
viduate stigmatized group
members. By defining individ-
uals in multiple ways other
than in terms of race, implicit
bias may be reduced.26
Strategy 3: Routinely check thought processes and deci-
sions for possible bias. When individuals engage in low-
effort information processing, they rely on stereotypes and pro-
duce more stereotype-consistent judgments than when
engaged in more deliberative, effortful processing.
(Bodenhausen, 1990). As a result, low-effort decision makers
tend to develop inferences or expectations about an individual
early on in the information-gathering process. These expecta-
tions then guide subsequent information processing:
Attention and subsequent recall are biased in favor of stereo-
type-confirming evidence and produce biased judgment.27
Expectations can also affect social interaction between the
decision maker (e.g., judge) and the stereotyped target (e.g.,
defendant), causing the decision maker to behave in ways that
inadvertently elicit stereotype-confirming behavior from the
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Strategy 2: 
Potential Actions to Take
• Individual: Participate in
diversity training that
focuses on multiculturalism,
associate with those commit-
ted to egalitarian goals,
and invest effort in identify-
ing the unique characteris-
tics of different members of
the same minority groups.
• Courts: Provide routine
diversity training that
emphasizes multiculturalism
and encourage court lead-
ers to promote egalitarian
behavior as part of a
court’s culture.
Strategy 1: 
Potential Actions to Take
• Individual: Seek information
on implicit bias by attending
educational sessions, taking
the IAT, and reading relevant
research.
• Courts: Provide education on
implicit bias that includes
judicial facilitators/presen-
ters, examples of implicit
bias across other profes-
sions, and exercises to make
the material more personally
relevant.
28. See Carl O. Word, Mark P. Zanna, & Joel Cooper, The Nonverbal
Mediation of Implicit Attitudes, Motivation, and a Climate for Racial
Bias, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 553 (2005).
29. See B. Keith Payne, Conceptualizing Control in Social Cognition:
How Executive Functioning Modulates the Expression of Automatic
Stereotyping, 89 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 488 (2005);
Brandon D. Stewart & B. Keith Payne, Bringing Automatic
Stereotyping Under Control: Implementation Intentions as Efficient
Means of Thought Control, 34 PERSONALITY & PSYCH. BULL. 1332
(2008).
30. See Evan R. Seamone, Understanding the Person Beneath the Robe:
Practical Methods for Neutralizing Harmful Judicial Bias, 42
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1 (2006).
31. See, e.g., Tracy D. Eells & Robert C. Showalter, Work-Related Stress
in American Trial Judges, 22 BULL. AMER. ACAD. PSYCH. & L. 71
(1994); L.R. Hartley & R.G. Adams, Effect of Noise on the Stroop
Test, 102 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 62 (1974);  Giora Keinan,
Decision Making Under Stress: Scanning of Alternatives Under
Controllable and Uncontrollable Threats, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 639 (1987). 
32. See, e.g., Ad van Knippenberg, Ap Dijksterhuis, & Diane
Vermeulen, Judgment and Memory of a Criminal Act: The Effects of
Stereotypes and Cognitive Load, 29 EURO. J. SOC. PSYCH. 191 (1999).
33. See, e.g., Galen V. Bodenhausen & Meryl Lichtenstein, Social
Stereotypes and Information-Processing Strategies: The Impact of
Task Complexity, 52 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 871 (1987).
34. See, e.g., Daniel T. Gilbert & J. Gregory Hixon, The Trouble of
Thinking: Activation and Application of Stereotypic Beliefs, 60 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 509 (1991); Jeffrey W. Sherman,
Angela Y. Lee, Gayle R. Bessenoff, & Leigh A. Frost, Stereotype
Efficiency Reconsidered: Encoding Flexibility Under Cognitive Load,
75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 589 (1998).
35. See C. Neil Macrae, Galen V. Godehausen, & Alan B. Milne, The
Dissection of Selection in Person Perception: Inhibitory Processes in
Social Stereotyping, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 397 (1995);
Jason P. Mitchell, Brian A. Nosek, & Mahzarin R. Banaji,
Contextual Variations in Implicit Evaluation, 132 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCH.:  GEN. 455 (2003).
36. See, e.g., Dasgupta et al., supra note 16; David DeSteno, Nilanjana
Dasgupta, Monica Y. Bartlett, & Aida Cajdric, Prejudice from Thin
Air: The Effect of Emotion on Automatic Intergroup Attitudes, 15
PSYCH. SCI. 319 (2004).
37. See Galen V. Bodenhausen, Geoffrey P. Kramer, & Karin Susser
Happiness and Stereotypic Thinking in Social Judgment, 66 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 621 (1994).
other person.28 Individuals
interested in minimizing the
impact of implicit bias on
their own judgment and
behaviors should actively
engage in more thoughtful,
deliberative information
processing.  When sufficient
effort is exerted to limit the
effects of implicit biases on
judgment, attempts to con-
sciously control implicit bias
can be successful.29
To do this, however, indi-
viduals must possess a cer-
tain degree of self-aware-
ness. They must be mindful
of their decision-making
processes rather than just
the results of decision mak-
ing30 to eliminate distrac-
tions, to minimize emo-
tional decision making, and
to objectively and deliberatively consider the facts at hand
instead of relying on schemas, stereotypes, and/or intuition. 
Strategy 4: Identify distractions and sources of stress in the
decision-making environment and remove or reduce them.
Tiring (e.g., long hours, fatigue), stressful (e.g., heavy, back-
logged, or very diverse caseloads; loud construction noise;
threats to physical safety; popular or political pressure about a
particular decision; emergency or crisis situations), or otherwise
distracting circumstances can adversely affect judicial perfor-
mance.31 Specifically, situations that involve time pressure32 that
force a decision maker to form complex judgments relatively
quickly33 or in which the deci-
sion maker is distracted and
cannot fully attend to incom-
ing information34 all limit the
ability to fully process case
information. Decision makers
who are rushed, stressed, dis-
tracted, or pressured are more
likely to apply stereotypes –
recalling facts in ways biased
by stereotypes and making
more stereotypic judgments –
than decision makers whose
cognitive abilities are not sim-
ilarly constrained. A decision-
maker may be more likely to
think in terms of race and use
implicit racial stereotypes35
because race often is a salient,
i.e., easily-accessible, attribute.
In addition, certain emotional
states (anger, disgust) can
exacerbate implicit bias in
judgments of stigmatized
group members, even if the
source of the negative emotion has nothing to do with the cur-
rent situation or with the issue of social groups or stereotypes
more broadly.36 Happiness may also produce more stereotypic
judgments, though this can be consciously controlled if the per-
son is motivated to do so.37
Given all these potential distractions and sources of stress,
decision makers need enough time and cognitive resources to
thoroughly process case information to avoid relying on intu-
itive reasoning processes that can result in biased judgments. 
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Strategy 3: 
Potential Actions to Take
• Individual: Use decision-sup-
port tools such as note-taking,
checklists, and bench cards
and techniques such as writ-
ing down the reasons for a
judgment to promote greater
deliberative as opposed to
intuitive thinking.
• Courts: Develop guidelines
and/or formal protocols for
decision makers to check and
correct for implicit bias (e.g.,
taking the other person’s per-
spective, imagining the per-
son is from a non-stigmatized
social group, thinking of
counter-stereotypic thoughts in
the presence of an individual
from a minority social group).
Strategy 4: 
Potential Actions to Take
• Individual: Allow more time
on cases in which implicit
bias might be a concern by,
for example, spending more
time reviewing the facts of
the case before committing
to a decision; consider
ways to clear your mind
(e.g., through meditation)
and focus completely on the
task at hand. 
• Courts: Review areas in
which judges and other
decision makers are likely to
be over-burdened and con-
sider options (e.g., reorga-
nizing court calendars) for
modifying procedures to
provide more time for deci-
sion making.
38. See, e.g., John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Aversive Racism
and Selection Decisions: 1989 and 1999, 11 Psych. Sci. 315, 318
(2000); James D. Johnson, Erik Whitestone, Lee Anderson
Jackson & Leslie Gatto, Justice Is Still Not Colorblind: Differential
Effects of Exposure to Inadmissible Evidence, 21 Personality & Soc.
Psych. Bull. 893  896-98 (1995).
39. See Eric L. Uhlmann & Geoffrey L. Cohen, Constructed Criteria:
Redefining Merit to Justify Discrimination, 16 Psych. Sci. 474
(2005).
40. See, e.g., Leanne S. Son Hing, Winnie Li, & Mark P. Zanna,
Inducing Hypocrisy to Reduce Prejudicial Response Among Aversive
Racists, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 71 (2002).
41. Cf. Saaid A. Mendoza, Peter M. Gollwitzer, & David M. Amodio,
Reducing the Expression of Implicit Stereotypes: Reflexive Control
Through Implementation Intentions, 36 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
BULL. 512 (2010) at 512 (finding that study participants given
instructions to develop specific implementation intentions—in
which a specific behavioral response is linked to an anticipated
situational cue—demonstrated improved performance accuracy
and less implicit stereotyping in the Shooter Task, a reaction time
measure of implicit bias, compared to participants who were sim-
ply prompted with a general accuracy goal); Kim, supra note 20 at
91 (finding that study participants given specific instructions for
trying to fake the results of an IAT were more successful than par-
ticipants given no or only general instructions for faking results).
42. For a review on feedback effects, see Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E.
Tetlock, 125 PSYCH. BULL. 255 (1999).
43. See, e.g., Plant & Devine, supra note 25.
44. See Lisa Legault, Jennifer N. Gutsell, & Michael Inzlicht, Ironic
Effects of Antiprejudice Messages: How Motivational Interventions
Can Reduce (But Also Increase) Prejudice, 22 PSYCH. SCI. 1472
(2011). 
Strategy 5: Identify
sources of ambiguity in the
decision-making context
and establish more con-
crete standards before
engaging in the decision-
making process. When the
basis for judgment is some-
what vague (e.g., situations
that call for discretion; cases
that involve the application
of new, unfamiliar laws),
biased judgments are more
likely.  Without more
explicit, concrete criteria for
decision making, individu-
als tend to disambiguate the
situation using whatever
information is most easily accessible—including stereotypes.38
In cases involving ambiguous factors, decision makers
should preemptively commit to specific decision-making crite-
ria (e.g., the importance of various types of evidence to the
decision) before hearing a case or reviewing evidence to mini-
mize the opportunity for implicit bias.39 Establishing this
structure before entering the decision-making context will
help prevent constructing criteria after the fact in ways biased
by implicit stereotypes but rationalized by specific types of evi-
dence (e.g., placing greater weight on stereotype-consistent
evidence in a case against a black defendant than one would in
a case against a white defendant).
Strategy 6: Institute feedback mechanisms. Providing egali-
tarian consensus information (i.e., information that others in
the court hold egalitarian beliefs rather than adhere to stereo-
typic beliefs) and other feedback mechanisms can be powerful
tools in promoting more egalitarian attitudes and behavior in
the court community. To encourage individual effort in
addressing personal implicit biases, court administration may
opt to provide judges and other court professionals with rele-
vant performance feedback. As part of this process, court
administration should consider the type of judicial decision-
making data currently avail-
able or easily obtained that
would offer judges meaning-
ful but nonthreatening feed-
back on demonstrated
biases. Transparent feedback
from regular or intermittent
peer reviews that raise per-
sonal awareness of biases
could prompt those with
egalitarian motives to do
more to prevent implicit
bias in future decisions and
actions.40 This feedback
should include concrete
suggestions on how to
improve performance41 and
could also involve recogni-
tion of those individuals
who display exceptional
fairness as positive rein-
forcement. 
Feedback tends to work
best when it (a) comes from
a legitimate, respected
authority, (b) addresses the
person’s decision-making
process rather than simply
the decision outcome, and
(c) when provided before
the person commits to a
decision rather than after-
wards, when he or she has already committed to a particular
course of action.42 Note, however, that feedback mechanisms
that apply coercive pressure to comply with egalitarian stan-
dards can elicit hostility from some types of individuals and
fail to mitigate implicit bias.43 By inciting hostility, these
imposed standards may even be counterproductive to egalitar-
ian goals, generating backlash in the form of increased explicit
and implicit prejudice.44
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• Courts: Develop protocols
that identify potential sources
of ambiguity; consider the
pros (e.g., more understand-
ing of issues) and cons (e.g.,
familiarity may lead to less
deliberative processing) of
using judges with special
expertise to handle cases
with greater ambiguity.
Strategy 6: 
Potential Actions to Take
• Individual: Seek feedback
through, for example, partici-
pating in a sentencing round
table discussing hypothetical
cases or consulting with a
skilled mentor or senior judge
about handling challenging
cases; ask for feedback from
colleagues, supervisors and
others regarding past perfor-
mance; document and review
the underlying logic of deci-
sions to ensure their sound-
ness.
• Courts: Periodically review a
judge’s case materials and
provide feedback and sug-
gestions for improvement as
needed; develop a bench-bar
committee to oversee an infor-
mal internal grievance
process and work with judges
as needed; convene sentenc-
ing round tables to discuss
hypothetical cases involving
implicit bias issues and
encourage more deliberate
thinking.
45. See Irene V. Blair, Jennifer E. Ma, & Alison P. Lenton, Imagining
Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes Through
Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 828 (2001).
46. See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the
Malleability of Automatic Attitudes: Combatting Automatic Prejudice
with Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCH. 800 (2001); Michael A. Olson & Russell H. Fazio,
Reducing Automatically Activated Racial Prejudice Through Implicit
Evaluative Conditioning, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 421
(2006).
47. See Nilanjana Dasgupta & Luis M. Rivera, When Social Context
Matters: The Influence of Long-Term Contract and Short-Term
Exposure to Admired Group Members on Implicit Attitudes and
Behavioral Intentions, 26 SOC. COGNITION 54 (2008); Nilanjana
Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing Is Believing: Exposure to
Counterstereotypic Women Leaders and Its Effect on the Malleability
of Automatic Gender Stereotyping, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH.
642 (2004).
48. See Kerry Kawakami, John F. Dovidio, Jasper Moll, Sander
Hermsen, & Abby Russin, Just Say No (to Stereotyping): Effects of
Training in the Negation of Stereotypic Associations on Stereotype
Activation, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 871 (2000).
49. See Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of
Intergroup Contact Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCH. 751
(2006).
50. See, e.g., MUZAFER SHERIF, O.J. HARVEY, B. JACK WHITE, WILLIAM R.
HOOD, & CAROLYN W. SHERIF, INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND
COOPERATION: THE ROBBERS CAVE EXPERIMENT (1961 ed.). 
51. See Patricia G. Devine, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic
and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 5
(1989); Laurie A. Rudman & Matthew R. Lee, Implicit and Explicit
Consequences of Exposure to Violent and Misogynous Rap Music, 5
GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 133 (2002). For examples of
how such communications can prime stereotypic actions and
judgments, see JERRY KANG & MAHZARIN R. BANAJI, FAIR MEASURES:
A BEHAVIORAL REALIST REVISION OF “AFFIRMATIVE ACTION” (2006).
52. See Devine, supra note 51.
53. Devine, supra note 51, at 16.
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role models,47 or extensive
practice making counter-
stereotypic associations.48
For individuals who seek
greater contact with
counter-stereotypic individ-
uals, such contact is more
effective when the counter-
stereotype is of at least equal
status in the workplace.49
Moreover, positive and meaningful interactions work best:
Cooperation is one of the most powerful forms of debiasing
contact.50
In addition to greater contact with counter-stereotypes,
this strategy also involves decreased exposure to stereotypes.
Certain environmental cues can automatically trigger stereo-
type activation and implicit bias. Images and language that
are a part of any signage, pamphlets, brochures, instructional
manuals, background music, or any other verbal or visual
communications in the court may inadvertently activate
implicit biases because they convey stereotypic informa-
tion.51 Identifying these communications and removing them
or replacing them with non-stereotypic or counter-stereo-
typic information can help decrease the amount of daily
exposure court employees and other legal professionals have
with the types of social stereotypes that underlie implicit
bias.
CONCLUSION
Research shows that individuals develop implicit attitudes
and stereotypes as a routine process of sorting and categoriz-
ing the vast amounts of sensory information they encounter on
an ongoing basis. Implicit, as opposed to explicit, attitudes and
stereotypes operate automatically, without awareness, intent,
or conscious control, and can operate even in individuals who
express low explicit bias.52 Because implicit biases are auto-
matic, they can influence or bias decisions and behaviors, both
positively and negatively, without an individual’s awareness.
This phenomenon leaves open the possibility that even those
dedicated to the principles of a fair justice system may, at
times, unknowingly make crucial decisions and act in ways
that are unintentionally unfair. Thus although courts may have
made great strides in eliminating explicit or consciously
endorsed racial bias, they, like all social institutions, may still
be challenged by implicit biases that are more difficult to iden-
tify and change. 
Psychology professor Patricia Devine argues that “prejudice
need not be the consequence of ordinary thought processes” if
individuals actively take steps to avoid the influence of implicit
biases on their behavior.53 Avoiding the influence of implicit
bias, however, is an effortful, as opposed to automatic, process
and requires intention, attention, and time. Combating implicit
bias, much like combating any habit, involves “becoming aware
of one’s implicit bias, being concerned about the consequences
of the bias, and learning to replace the biased response with
non-prejudiced responses—ones that more closely match the
values people consciously believe that they hold.”54
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• Individual: View images
(e.g., by hanging photos, cre-
ating new screen savers and
desk top images) of admired
individuals (e.g., Martin
Luther King, Jr.) of the stereo-
typed social group; spend
more time with individuals
who are counter-stereotypic
role models; practice making
positive, i.e., counter-stereo-
typic, associations, with mem-
bers of minority social
groups.
• Courts: Assess visual and
auditory communications for
implicit bias and modify to




social groups in valued,
authoritative roles in the court
to foster positive intergroup
relations and provide immedi-
ately accessible counter-
stereotype examples.
55. Shawn Marsh, The Lens of Implicit Bias, 18 JUV. & FAMILY J. TODAY
16, 18 (2009)(acronyms omitted).
Once judges and court professionals become aware of
implicit bias, examples of strategies they can use to help com-
bat it and encourage egalitarianism are:
• Consciously acknowledge group and individual dif-
ferences (i.e., adopt a multiculturalism approach to
egalitarianism rather than a color-blindness strategy
in which one tries to ignore these differences); 
• Routinely check thought processes and decisions for
possible bias (i.e., adopt a thoughtful, deliberative,
and self-aware process for inspecting how one’s deci-
sions are made); 
• Identify sources of stress and reduce them in the deci-
sion-making environment; 
• Identify sources of ambiguity and impose greater
structure in the decision-making context;
• Institute feedback mechanisms; and 
• Increase exposure to stereotyped group members
(e.g., seek out greater contact with the stigmatized
group in a positive context). 
Those dedicated to the principles of a fair justice system
who have worked to eliminate explicit bias from the system
and in their own decisions and behaviors may nonetheless be
influenced by implicit bias. Providing information on implicit
bias offers judges and court staff an opportunity to explore this
possibility and to consider strategies to address it. It also pro-
vides an opportunity to engage judges and court professionals
in a dialog on broader race and ethnic fairness issues in a
thoughtful and constructive manner: 
Recognizing that implicit bias appears to be relatively
universal provides an interesting foundation for broad-
ening discussions on issues such as minority over-repre-
sentation, disproportionate minority contact, and gen-
der or age discrimination. In essence, when we look at
research on social cognitive processes such as implicit
bias we understand that these processes are normal
rather than pathological. This does not mean we should
use them as an excuse for prejudice or discrimination.
Rather, they give us insight into how we might go about
avoiding the pitfalls we face when some of our informa-
tion processing functions outside of our awareness.55
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